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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: IMPOSITION OF DEATH
PENALTY AFTER SUCCESSFUL APPEAL FROM SENTENCE
TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT HELD TO VIOLATE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY PROVISION OF CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
THE Supreme Court of California has recently limited the ex-
tent to which a criminal defendant who obtains a reversal of
an erroneous conviction thereby exposes himself to further jeop-
ardy. In People v. Henderson1 it was held that the California con-
stitutional provision against double jeopardy forbids the later im-
position of the death penalty upon a defendant who has once been
sentenced to life imprisonment and has appealed from that judg-
ment.
After a plea of guilty to a charge of murder in the first degree,
defendant Henderson was sentenced to life imprisonment by a
judge. Following a reversal of the conviction, a plea of not guilty
was entered at the second trial. Henderson was again convicted,
but this time was sentenced to death by a jury. The California
Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction, became the first
American court to hold that a sentence to life imprisonment con-
stitutes an implied acquittal of a crime sufficiently atrocious to
justify the death penalty and is therefore a bar to the subsequent
imposition of that penalty.2
The court based its decision on Green v. United States,3 in
386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
2Id. at 686, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 86. This decision reversed the prior California decision
of People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592, 91 Pac. 515 (1907). See note 8 infra.
- 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
Prior to the Green case, the rights of a defendant in a federal court were deter-
mined by the "waiver" theory, under which the defendant was deemed to have waived
his right to plead former jeopardy by appealing his conviction. Although early adopted
by many state and lower federal courts, e.g., United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. 131
(No. 15301) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846); State v. Terreso, 56 Kan. 126, 42 Pac. 354 (1895);
People v. Dowling, 84 N.Y. 478 (1881), this doctrine was not expressly adopted by the
Supreme Court until 1896. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1896); Trono
v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533-34 (1905).
Under this theory a defendant, on retrial, could be prosecuted as if no trial had
previously taken place, and thus could be convicted of a greater offense after a
reversed conviction of a lesser offense. Trono v. United States, supra.
Moreover, a defendant could be subjected to the imposition of a greater penalty
on retrial after a successful appeal. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919);
Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900) (sentence increased from minimum of
ten years to twelve years, six months).
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which the United States Supreme Court held that a conviction for
second degree murder, upon an indictment for first degree murder,
constituted an implied acquittal of the greater charge and pre-
cluded a subsequent prosecution for that offense.4 Even though
.the Green case involved two separate and distinct offenses, whereas
the present case was concerned with only different penalties for
the same offense, the California court concluded that it would be
unrealistic to draw any distinction on that basis. The court found
that the dichotomy of punishments made the crime so similar to
two separate offenses that the defendant should be treated as if he
had been convicted of a greater offense on retrial.5 This, in effect,
divided the crime of first degree murder into two subdegrees.
The court concluded that a contrary holding would unreasonably
impair the right of appeal by forcing the defendant to make the
difficult choice of accepting an erroneous conviction or bringing
an appeal which would again place his life in jeopardy.0
Federal interpretations of the double jeopardy provisions of the
fifth amendment are clearly not binding on the California courts.
They are persuasive, however, as the wording of the guarantees
against double jeopardy in the Federal and California constitutions is
In Stroud v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court considered the very point
biought up in the Henderson case. It held that a sentence to life imprisonment
could be increased to death upon retrial after a successful appeal by the defendant.
With Trono v. United States, supra, as authority that a defendant could be convicted
of a lesser offense, the Court could hardly hold otherwise. However, the decision was
:not based on that point, but on a holding that "the fact that the jury may thus
mitigate the punishment to imprisonment for life did not render the conviction less
than one for first degree murder." Stroud v. United States, supra at 18. Thus it
does not appear, as the present court felt, that the overruling of the Trono case
necessarily vitiated the Stroud decision.
This waiver theory was severely limited by the Supreme Court in the Green case,
in which the Court held that waiver of a constitutional right by a defendant in
order to appeal was impossible-the defendant could not be deemed to have volun-
tarily relinquished a constitutional right when the only alternative was to suffer an
erroneous judgment. Green v. United States, supra at 191-92. Since the Trono case was
limited to its facts, it was effectively overruled.
'The Court reasoned that the defendant had a valid defense to a second prosecution
for first degree murder because the jury at the first trial either acquitted him of that
crime or was discharged without his consent without reaching a verdict on it. The fact
that he initiated an appeal from his conviction for second degree murder did not
deprive him of the right to plead former jeopardy as to the greater charge because a
defendant cannot be deemed to forego a valid defense to a charge of first degree
niurder in order to secure a reversal of an erroneous conviction of a lesser offense.
Green v. United States, supra note 3.




almost identical.7 California law has, in fact, closely paralleled the
developments of the federal law.8 The California Supreme Court, in
Gomez v. Superior Court,9 had already adopted the Green rationale
and even recognized the application of the doctrine of implied ac-
quittal to a conviction of a lesser included offense.10
Implied acquittal is based on the assumption that the finder
of fact has, through its silence as to the greater crime charged, found
the defendant innocent of that crime.1 Although this doctrine has
Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 640, 649, 328 P.2d 976, 982 (1958).
The United States Constitution provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb." U.S. CONSr. amend. V. The
California constitution states that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense." CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 13, cl. 4. CAL. PEN. CODE § 687 states that "no
person can be subjected to a second prosecution for a public offense for which he has
once been prosecuted and convicted or acquitted."
8 In California, a conviction of a lesser degree of a crime than that charged was not
considered an acquittal of the greater charge. People v. McNeer, 14 Cal. App. 2d 22, 57
P.2d 1018 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936); People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 3 Pac. 818 (1884).
This line of authority was overruled in Gomez v. Superior Court, supra note 7.
Compare McNeer, Keefer, and Gomez, with cases cited in note 3, supra.
In People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592, 91 Pac. 515 (1907), the court considered the issue
which was before the court in the instant case. Although the case could have been
decided on the authority of People v. Keefer, supra, the court chose not to base its
decision on that point. Instead, it held that "the discretion given to the jury to
mitigate the punishment upon a conviction of murder in the first degree, and inflict
imprisonment for life only, does not, after such a verdict, divide that degree of murder
into two degrees, but merely reduces the punishment.... The former conviction was
not an acquittal of the first degree of murder nor of any degree thereof." 151 Cal.
at 598, 91 Pac. at 517.
The court in the Henderson case, however, stated that the overruling of Keefer
by Gomez v. Superior Court, supra, vitiated the rationale of Grill. 386 P.2d at 686,
35 Cal. Rptr. at 86. This conclusion does not seem to be warranted since the court
in that case deliberately chose not to decide the case on the basis of the Keefer decision.
'50 Cal. 2d 640, 328 P.2d 976 (1958).
20 Id. at 693, 328 P.2d at 977.
This has been established law in California for over one hundred years. See In re
Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171, 288 P.2d 5 (1955); People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 184 P.2d 512
(1947); People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 227, 33 Pac. 901 (1893); People v. Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376
(1854). The rationale behind these decisions is that the greater and lesser offenses are
different crimes with different facts to be proven, and retrial of one offense does not
necessarily demand retrial of the other offense. People v. Gordon, supra at 232, 33
Par. at 902.
"The cases are not clear as to whether it is the conviction of the lesser offense or
the silence as to the greater charge which constitutes the acquittal of that charge.
See Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1141 (1958). However, it was noted in the Green case that
"Green's claim of former jeopardy is not based on his previous conviction for second
degree murder but instead on the original jury's refusal to convict him of first degree
murder." 355 U.S. at 190 n.11.
Moreover it is the general rule that when a verdict is silent as to some of the
offenses charged, the accused is deemed to have been acquitted of them. See, e.g.,
Bolton v. State, 24 Ala. App. 473, 137 So. 903 (1931); People v. Gessinger, 238 Mich.
Vol. 1964: 915]
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been criticized on the ground that a conviction of the lesser charge
more accurately reflects jury leniency than any finding of innocence,12
it is followed by a majority of American jurisdictions. 13
Prior to the present case, however, no jurisdiction had gone so
far as to subdivide any offense and find an implied acquittal based
on the different punishments possible.' 4 Since the jury is faced with
such clear cut alternatives of life or death, however, such a division,
at least with respect to first degree murder, appears to have much
validity. It may well be true that a sentence to life imprisonment
will to some extent reflect the leniency of the judge or jury. Never-
theless, implicit in such a sentence is a finding that the crime is not
sufficiently atrocious to demand the death penalty. This is the same
type of finding of fact as that in a conviction for second degree
murder on an indictment charging first degree murder. In each in-
stance, the judge or jury determines that the defendant's act is not
such as to warrant the maximum penalty.'5 This fact finding nature
625, 214 N.W. 184 (1927); Commonwealth v. Day, 114 Pa. Super. 511, 174 At. 646
(1934).
1-See Comment, 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 461 (1958); 56 MICH. L. REv. 1192 (1958); 15
WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 276 (1958).
1" It now appears that the Green doctrine is followed in twenty jurisdictions, while
the Trono doctrine is followed in nineteen jurisdictions. In addition to jurisdictions
listed in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 216 n.4 (1957), New Jersey and Washing-
ton, along with the federal courts, have adopted the Green rule. State v. Williams,
30 N.J. 105, 152 A.2d 9 (1959); State v. Schoel, 54 Wash. 2d 388, 341 P.2d 481 (1959).
Arizona and Alaska have adopted the Trono rule that the defendant may be tried again
for the greater offense. United States v. Frank, 8 Alaska 436 (1933); State v. Thomas,
88 Ariz. 269, 356 P.2d 20 (1960).
"The question of an implied acquittal based on the different punishments possible
for a crime has apparently never arisen in other than first degree murder cases.
However, with respect to first degree murder it has been decided in seven jurisdic-
tions. The leading case in the federal courts is Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15
(1919), and that in California was People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592, 91 Pac. 515 (1907);
Mann v. State, 23 Fla. 610, 3 So. 207 (1887); State v. Kneeskern, 203 Iowa 929
210 N.W. 465 (1926); Commonwealth v. Alessio, 313 Pa. 537, 169 At. 764 (1934); Greer
v. State, 62 Tenn. 321 (1874). All held that the death penalty could be imposed on
retrial, and all were decided in jurisdictions in which a conviction of a lesser offense
than the one charged constituted an implied acquittal and a bar to further prosecution
for the greater offense.
"'The present holding would appear to apply equally to sentences imposed by
judge and jury, whether on guilty or not guilty pleas. In each instance the life of the
defendant is in jeopardy and either the court or jury must, after a consideration of
evidence relating to the character of the defendant and his crime, decide between
life and death. It is immaterial to the defendant whether a judge determining sentence
or a jury determining guilt has ruled that his crime is not so atrocious as to warrant
the death penalty. In either case there is an implied acquittal meeting the require-
ments of the Green rationale.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the Green case, stated: "As a practical
[Vol. 1964: 915
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of sentencing is well illustrated by the California Penal Code pro-
visions for a separate trial on the issue of penalty after the guilt of
the accused is determined. 6 In this trial the jury hears evidence
relating to sentence, and implicit in the penalty imposed is a finding
of fact as to the character of the crime.17
The basic purpose of the prohibition against double jeopardy
is to prevent the state from making repeated attempts to convict
an individual for an alleged offense.' Although such governmental
action was only in response to the defendant's appeal in the Green
case, the Court stated that the constitutional provision should be
matter, and on any basis of human values, it is scarcely possible to distinguish a case
in which the defendant is convicted of a greater offense from one in which he is con-
victed of an offense that has the same name as that of which he was previously
convicted but carries a significantly different punishment, namely death rather than
imprisonment." 355 U.S. at 213.
a CAL. PaiN. CODE § 190.1 (Supp. 1963) provides that if a defendant has been found
guilty of an offense punishable in the alternative by life imprisonment or death,
"there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of penalty, and the trier of
fact shall fix the penalty."
This trier of fact may be a jury or, if the defendant waives his right to a jury, a
judge. In either case the trier of fact has absolute discretion in determining the
penalty, and, in the absence of error, the appellate court has no power to overturn
the determination. People v. Cash, 52 Cal. 2d 841, 345 P.2d 462 (1959).
17,,Evidence may be presented at the further proceedings on the issue of penalty.
. . . The determination of the penalty of life imprisonment or death shall be
in the discretion of the court or jury trying the issue of fact on the evidence presented."
CAL. ParN. CODE § 190.1 (Supp. 1963). Thus the jury is bound to make its choice of
penalty conform to a finding of fact on the evidence presented. See 31 So. CAL.
L. REv. 200 (1958).
In California the provision for a bifurcated trial applies equally to defendants who
plead guilty and those who plead not guilty. Even if, as in the present case, the
defendant pleads guilty, he is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of penalty. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 190.1 (Supp. 1963). If he waives the right to a jury trial on penalty after
pleading guilty, the judge will impose the sentence after a consideration of the
evidence. People v. Jones, 52 Cal. 2d 636, 343 P.2d 577 (1959).
In the federal courts the jury in a capital case may make a binding recommendation
for imprisonment when they return the verdict. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1958). See Andres
v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948). If no such recommendation is made, or if the
defendant pleads guilty, the sentence is determined by the judge after hearing evidence
presented by the defendant and by an impartial presentence commission. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32.
The majority of the states allow the jury to determine the penalty in capital cases
unless the defendant pleads guilty, in which case the judge does the sentencing after
hearing evidence as to penalty. See Andres v. United States, supra. See generally
MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PRoCDEURE 283-94 (1959); Comment, 1 TEXAs L. & LEG.
124 (1947).
In the remaining states either the death penalty is abolished or mandatory, or the
jury may make only a recommendation. See Andres v. United States, supra at 767.
18 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S.
684, 688 (1949); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 170-71 (1873).
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given wide application in order to protect the right to appeal.1 '
In so holding, the Court alleviated the situation in which the de-
fendant's right to appeal would be conditioned on placing his life
in jeopardy for a second time. As stated by the Court, "the law
should not, and in our judgment does not, place the defendant in
such an incredible dilemma." 20
Moreover, it is in the interest of the state to eliminate error from
trials, and the encouraging of appeals from possibly erroneous con-
victions tends to accomplish this end. Yet, appeals will be dis-
couraged in capital cases if the defendant, sentenced to life im-
prisonment, must risk his life in order to appeal. Indeed, the great
value placed on human life by our society demands that the greatest
protection of the right to appeal be afforded to a defendant on trial
for his life.21
The language of Henderson, if taken literally, does not limit its
application to capital cases. The court stated that it makes no
difference whether the legislature divided a crime into degrees or
allowed the court to impose different punishments for the same
crime.22 The double jeopardy effect is the same. Carried to its
logical extreme, this rationale would prevent any increase in punish-
ment on retrial in all criminal cases. Such extension does not seem
desirable. 23
Any distinction between application of the doctrine of implied




This is actually the paramount problem with which the Green and Gomez cases
were concerned. The court in the Henderson case, like those in Green and Gomez,
stresses this same policy consideration, and this would seem to be at least as much of a
basis for the decision as a strict interpretation of the double jeopardy provision of the
California constitution.
2 386 P.2d at 686, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
23 The dissenting justice in the instant case felt that if the present decision were
limited to capital offenses the discrimination against defendants not on trial for
their lives would be "grossly unfair" and "without rational foundation." 386 P.2d at
691, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
However, this appears no more objectionable than other discriminations against
defendants not on trial for their lives. Defendants on trial for their lives are not
allowed to plead guilty without benefit of counsel. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1018. Defendants
on trial for their lives have the right to be represented by two counsel, a right which
may be restricted for other defendants. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1095. Defendants sentenced
to death have the benefit of an automatic appeal. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1239. These
protections are provided because of the importance of a trial in which a defendant's
life is at stake.
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acquittal in capital and non-capital cases appears to be one of degree
rather than kind. The essence of the application of implied acquittal
in capital cases is the fact that there are only two penalties-life and
death. The grave significance of the taking of a life by the state has
resulted in strong efforts to abolish capital punishment.24 However,
there is no such significance attached to long prison sentences. There
is a profound distinction between the imposition of a sentence to a
certain term in prison for an offense which might warrant a longer
term, as compared to the imposition of a sentence to imprisonment
for an offense for which the death penalty is also authorized. In the
latter case there is a much stronger inference that there has been a
finding that there were certain facts absent from the offense which,
if present, would have justified the greater penalty. The more
numerous the possible penalties there are for an offense and the less
distinct the difference between them, the less likely it is that the
choice of one represents a precise ruling on the character of the
crime.
It is commonly accepted that a sentence can be increased on re-
trial.25 As emphasized by the dissent in the instant case, many com-
mon sentencing practices, such as increasing punishment on retrial
from fine to imprisonment or from probation to imprisonment,
would be forbidden by an extension of the holding of this case to
non-capital cases.26 Moreover, if the Henderson doctrine were ex-
tended to include non-capital cases, the number of appeals would be
greatly increased. Although the additional appellate burden forth-
coming in capital cases would seem to be but a small price to pay
for the intense social interest advanced, the interest furthered by
the wholesale encouragement to appeal in all cases would appear to
be overbalanced by the great burden which would be placed on the
appellate courts. In addition, Henderson is based in part on the
policy that a defendant's right to appeal from an erroneous judgment
is unreasonably impaired when he is required to risk his life in
2See generally JOHNSEN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1939); SE.LIN, MURDER AND THE
PENALTY OF DEATH (Annals, vol. 284, 1952); WEIHOFEN, THE URGE To PUNISH (1956);
Hearings Before Subcommittee No. Two of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
86th Gong., 2nd Sess., ser. 21 (1960); REPORT OF ThE CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMIT=rr ON
JUDICIARY ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1960).
" See, e.g., Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900); King v. United States,
98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Kohlfuss v. Warden, 149 Conn. 692, 183 A.2d 626 (1962);
McDowell v. State, 225 Ind. 495, 76 N.E.2d 249 (1947); Hichs v. Commonwealth,
185 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 1962).
2 386 P.2d at 691, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
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order to invoke that right. Henderson, like the Green decision, was
designed to prevent the defendant from being forced to take a
"desperate chance" by appealing his conviction.2 7 The relative in-
significance of this consideration in a noncapital case is apparent.
vrSee note 21 supra and accompanying text.
